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Abstract
Background: Research in modern biomedicine and social science requires sample sizes
so large that they can often only be achieved through a pooled co-analysis of data from
several studies. But the pooling of information from individuals in a central database that
may be queried by researchers raises important ethico-legal questions and can be con-
troversial. In the UK this has been highlighted by recent debate and controversy relating
to the UK’s proposed ‘care.data’ initiative, and these issues reflect important societal
and professional concerns about privacy, confidentiality and intellectual property.
DataSHIELD provides a novel technological solution that can circumvent some of
the most basic challenges in facilitating the access of researchers and other healthcare
professionals to individual-level data.
Methods: Commands are sent from a central analysis computer (AC) to several data
computers (DCs) storing the data to be co-analysed. The data sets are analysed simultan-
eously but in parallel. The separate parallelized analyses are linked by non-disclosive
summary statistics and commands transmitted back and forth between the DCs and the
AC. This paper describes the technical implementation of DataSHIELD using a modified
R statistical environment linked to an Opal database deployed behind the computer
firewall of each DC. Analysis is controlled through a standard R environment at the AC.
Results: Based on this Opal/R implementation, DataSHIELD is currently used by the
Healthy Obese Project and the Environmental Core Project (BioSHaRE-EU) for the feder-
ated analysis of 10 data sets across eight European countries, and this illustrates the
opportunities and challenges presented by the DataSHIELD approach.
Conclusions: DataSHIELD facilitates important research in settings where: (i) a co-
analysis of individual-level data from several studies is scientifically necessary but gov-
ernance restrictions prohibit the release or sharing of some of the required data, and/or
render data access unacceptably slow; (ii) a research group (e.g. in a developing nation)
is particularly vulnerable to loss of intellectual property—the researchers want to fully
share the information held in their data with national and international collaborators, but
do not wish to hand over the physical data themselves; and (iii) a data set is to be
included in an individual-level co-analysis but the physical size of the data precludes
direct transfer to a new site for analysis.
Key words: DataSHIELD, pooled analysis, ELSI, privacy, confidentiality, disclosure, distributed computing, intellec-
tual property, bioinformatics
Key Messages
• DataSHIELD provides a solution when ethico-legal considerations prevent or impede data-sharing and analysis.
• It promotes and facilitates collaborations by empowering data owners and affording them better control over their data.
• DataSHIELD has the potential to protect the intellectual property of researchers in institutions and countries with
limited resources, thus enabling more balanced collaborations with wealthier partners.
• It also improves the governance and management of data by allowing them to be maintained locally.
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Introduction
The analysis of complex interrelated datasets containing
demographic, social, health-related and/or biological infor-
mation derived from large numbers of individuals has
become pivotal to the investigation of disease causation
and to the evaluation of healthcare programmes and inter-
ventions. However, the daunting sample sizes needed to
provide adequate statistical power1–3 often exceed the
provision of any one single study. Furthermore, if major re-
search funders are to optimize return on their investment of
public or charitable money, it is crucial that researchers other
than those who originally created a particular data set are
able to access and work with those data.4 These two impera-
tives underpin the active encouragement of ‘data sharing’—
across several studies, or from a single data source—which is
central to contemporary bioscience.5 The data to be shared
may be derived from large epidemiological studies, from
smaller research projects and/or from healthcare or adminis-
trative records. They may originally have been intended for
research or for direct support of patient care or public health.
There is no doubt that liberating and integrating such infor-
mation to support medical research has the potential to gen-
erate enormous future health benefits. But substantive
challenges exist, and the sharing of data—particularly
individual-level data, also known as microdata6—raises im-
portant societal and professional concerns.
In the UK, these concerns were recently highlighted by
controversy surrounding the care.data project.7,8 At a soci-
etal level they include real and perceived frailties of infor-
mation governance when a research database containing
potentially sensitive personal information about individ-
uals is made accessible to any third party including re-
searchers.4 However, these broader societal concerns are
closely—though not precisely—mirrored in the disquiet of
some professional health researchers regarding the unfet-
tered sharing of valuable scientific data that they believe
exist primarily because they have made a substantial in-
vestment of their own time, effort and scientific thought to
creating and managing them. In both instances, individuals
for whom the data to be shared are valuable and poten-
tially sensitive (personally, or as intellectual property)
worry that, once they have been physically ‘shared’, there
will be a significant loss of control over their subsequent
exploitation. In support of this thesis, we have noted9 that
researchers are often more than willing to share the infor-
mation contained in their data—because this enhances the
quality and quantity of their own scientific output by pro-
viding opportunities for national and international collab-
oration. But they are sometimes less keen to hand over the
physical data themselves,9 because even with ethically and
legally binding safeguards in place, the loss of governance
control over the data themselves and the intellectual prop-
erty they represent can be seen as seriously problematic.
This is particularly so for data creators with limited re-
sources for managing and scientifically exploiting their
own data—e.g. researchers in developing countries.
Effective and acceptable solutions must be found to all of
these problems if we are to optimize evidence-based pro-
gress in stratified and conventional medicine.
Many technical and policy measures can be enacted to
render data sharing more secure from a governance per-
spective and less likely to result in loss of intellectual prop-
erty. For example, data owners might restrict data release
to aggregate statistics alone, or may limit the number of
variables that individual researchers might access for speci-
fied purposes. Alternatively, secure analysis centres, such
as the ESRC Secure Data Service,10 and SAIL,11 represent
major informatics infrastructures that can provide a safe
haven for remote or local analysis/linkage of data from
selected sources while preventing researchers from down-
loading the original data themselves. However, to comple-
ment pre-existing solutions to the important challenges
now faced, the DataSHIELD consortium has developed a
flexible new way to comprehensively analyse individual-
level data collected across several studies or sources while
keeping the original data strictly secure. As a technology,
DataSHIELD uses distributed computing and parallelized
analysis to enable full joint analysis of individual-level data
from several sources—e.g. research projects or health or
administrative data—without the need for those data to
move, or even be seen, outside the study where they usually
reside.12 Crucially, because it does not require underpin-
ning by a major informatics infrastructure and because it is
based on non-commercial open source software, it is both
locally implementable and very cost effective.
Co-analysis of data from several studies/sources is often
conducted using study-level meta-analysis (SLMA),13–15
using conventional meta-analysis to combine results gener-
ated by each study separately.16,17 In contrast, individual-
level meta-analysis (ILMA)involves the physical transfer of
data from each study to produce a single central database
that is then analysed as if it were a conventional multi-
centre data set.16,17 Unfortunately, both SLMA and ILMA
present significant problems.12,16,17 Because SLMA com-
bines analytical results (e.g. means, odds ratios, regression
coefficients) produced ahead of time by the contributing
studies, it can be very inflexible: only the pre-planned ana-
lyses undertaken by all the studies can be converted into
joint results across all studies combined. Any additional
analyses must be requested post hoc. This hinders explora-
tory analysis,16 for example the investigation of
sub-groups, or interactions between key variables. In
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contrast, ILMA is very flexible, but ethico-legal consider-
ations can impede access to individual-level data. Thus, re-
search may be delayed if formal data access procedures are
protracted, or may have to be postponed while participants
have reconsented.18,19 ILMA may even be impossible if con-
sent forms prohibit individual-level data being sent to exter-
nal researchers, or if privacy legislation precludes sharing of
data across national or jurisdictional boundaries.12,20,21
DataSHIELD circumvents these problems. First, it can
be set up to be mathematically equivalent to ILMA,12,22,23
while avoiding the attendant governance, legal or societal
concerns.21,24 Individual-level data never cross, and are
never visible outside, the firewall of their home
study.12,20,24 Jones et al.22 explain why fitting a general-
ized linear model (GLM) under DataSHIELD produces
exactly the same results—not just a good approximation—
as a GLM fitted to a single database containing the individ-
ual-level data from all studies combined. This is confirmed
empirically in the current article by the comparison of the
output of a GLM model fitted initially via DataSHIELD on
all studies separately, and then through R on the pooled
data (i.e. the separate data sets stacked together into one
table). Second, however, DataSHIELD can also be configured
to mimic a secure SLMA but without the need to ask individ-
ual studies to undertake their own analyses. Under
DataSHIELD, any non-disclosive analysis may therefore be re-
quested at any time without physically sharing data.
DataSHIELD can also protect intellectual property when data
producers are keen for external researchers to query and work
with their data but do not wish to lose ultimate control by
physically transferring their data. This can even apply to a sin-
gle study—single-site DataSHIELD—which may be viewed as
being a particularly simple and cost-effective way to construct
a ‘secure data enclave’ within which data can be comprehen-
sively analysed but not accessed. For all of these reasons,
DataSHIELD encourages ‘true’, equal-status collaboration.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic IT infrastructure for a
hypothetical DataSHIELD implementation for co-analy-
sing six studies. The individual-level data themselves re-
main on ‘data computers’ (DCs) at their home bases.
A central ‘analysis computer’ (AC) is used to issue com-
mands to enact and control the analysis. As a by-product
of its underlying structure, DataSHIELD can enhance gov-
ernance and data management because data are locally
maintained by their producers who typically know them
best; that is, it encourages storage, updating and sharing of
complex multi-class data from ongoing studies through a
federated rather than a centralized architecture. However,
this does not deny the important complementary role of
large centralized repositories specializing in archiving par-
ticular classes of data, such as the European Genome-
Phenome Archive25 or the UK Data Service.10 As an
additional consequence of its structure, DataSHIELD can
also avoid the need to move very large data sets. Finally, be-
cause all data remain unobserved at their home repository,
DataSHIELD can mitigate some of the dilemmas arising
from findings of actionable clinical significance in individ-
uals.26 Specifically, external researchers cannot, in principle,
produce results pertaining to individual participants. Rather,
individual clinical results can only be generated by investiga-
tors working with data from their own study and these inves-
tigators should be covered by formal internal policies.
DataSHIELD offers both opportunities and challenges.
It has been known for several years that it works in prin-
ciple,12,22 but its practical implementation and utilization
on an IT platform that can be used by non-expert re-
searchers has proved to be challenging. This paper de-
scribes the application platform that has now been
developed. It explains each of the fundamental steps in a
typical DataSHIELD analysis and outlines the key elements
of the infrastructure that underpins these steps. Illustration
is based on a real-world setting in which DataSHIELD is
currently being used to analyse data for a pan-European
consortium: the Healthy Obese Project (HOP).27 Finally,
we briefly discuss a potential future role of DataSHIELD
in circumventing some of the privacy and confidentiality
concerns arising—as under care.data7,8—when progress in
biomedical science might be accelerated if researchers
could easily access and co-analyse data held in multiple
sources, including healthcare, social or governmental data,
that may have been administratively generated.
Methods
The IT infrastructure
The IT infrastructure required to carry out a DataSHIELD
analysis comprises three main components: a computer ser-
ver at each source study hosting an Opal database;28
Figure 1. Typical DataSHIELD setting for a pooled individual-level
analysis.
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the statistical programming environment(R29); and
DataSHIELD-specific R libraries installed on the data ser-
vers (data computers¼DCs) and on the client computer
(analysis computer ¼ AC). Opal is a core database applica-
tion for biobanks and epidemiological studies developed
by the Maelstrom Research group30 in collaboration with
OBiBa, an international software development project cre-
ating open-source software for Biobanks.31 Opal, R and
DataSHIELD are open source and freely available.
Instances of Opal, the R server and the DataSHIELD
server-side R libraries are implemented behind the firewall
of each data owner’s DC (Figure 2). The AC is used to en-
act and control the distributed analysis. The DataSHIELD
client-side R libraries are installed on the AC (Figure 2).
A DataSHIELD platform consists of at least one AC com-
municating with a number of DCs or with just one DC
(i.e. single-site DataSHIELD).
DataSHIELD process explained
DataSHIELD as described in this article is intended for the
pooled analysis of ‘horizontally partitioned’ data, i.e. con-
tributing sources hold the same variables but on different
individuals (see Figure 3b). A new version of DataSHIELD
is currently being developed for ‘vertically partitioned’
data where various sources hold different variables on the
same individuals (see Figure 3c). This uses an overlapping
range of secure approaches to secure data integration and
retains the same fundamental principle: leave the data
where they are but analyse them as if they were combined
in one database.
As for any co-analysis, shared data must be harmonized
first. The harmonization phase of the HOP project32
within BioSHaRE-EU33 (described in detail else-
where27,34,35) is functionally independent of DataSHIELD
itself (Table 1, step 0).
DataSHIELD functions
The fundamental building blocks of DataSHIELD are its
client-side and server-side functions. As illustrated in
Figure 2, server-side functions reside in the modified R en-
vironments located behind the firewall of the DC at each
individual study. It is the server-side functions that actually
process the individual-level data at the distinct repositories.
The outputs from server-side functions (non-disclosive
study-level statistics) represent the only information that
ever leaves a DC, and this is why we can claim that
DataSHIELD allows full analysis of individual-level data
without those data ever having to be moved, or even
Figure 2. Overview of the IT infrastructure required for a DataSHIELD process. The settings are the same in all DCs so only one is highlighted in
this figure.
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rendered visible, outside their study of origin. Client-side
functions reside on the conventional R environment on the
AC. Client-side functions call and control server-side func-
tions and combine information across different repositories
when required. All DataSHIELD functions require ap-
proval under a technical and governance process including
external independent evaluation.
DataSHIELD secure analyses
An iterative analysis (e.g. fitting a generalized linear model
[GLM]) is illustrated in Figure 4: its steps are detailed in
Table 1.The same process is triggered simultaneously in all
four DCs. The process iterates through steps 5–8 until
the combined coefficient estimates remain unchanged be-
tween two iterations (according to a pre-defined tolerance
criterion). Once convergence is achieved the AC uses the
final score vectors and information matrices from all data
sets to provide definitive estimates of regression coefficients,
their standard errors and other non-disclosive model out-
puts. One-step analyses are analogous to iterative analyses
but do not require repeated loops. For example, to construct
a contingency table, each study generates its own table in
one step—this is inherentlynon-disclosive—and the AC inte-
grates these to produce a combined table.
Disclosure control—examples
Some functions that are not intrinsically disclosive can
nevertheless be problematic in certain settings. Thus, a
contingency table with 1–4 observations in any one cell is
often viewed as providing a potential disclosure risk.21 To
address this problem under DataSHIELD, each DC tests
any contingency table it creates and will only return a full
table to the AC if all cells are empty or contain at least five
observations. All the AC knows is that it has received an
incomplete table which is so constructed that nothing dis-
closive can be inferred—Sub-setting—e.g. by sex, age or
phenotypic sub-type—is crucial in statistical analysis. But
repeated sub-setting may produce sub-groups that are so
small that results based on that subset (e.g. a mean) might
potentially be disclosive. Under DataSHIELD, therefore, it
is not possible to generate a subset data set containing 1–4
observations. However, this rule may be relaxed or made
more stringent at the request of the principal investigator
who is seen as taking responsibility for the overall analysis.
The DataSHIELD project is currently working on govern-
ance rules for sub-setting.
Results: DataSHIELD at work
Analyses of data from the Health Obese Project
The Healthy Obese Project (HOP)27,32 is part of the
BioSHaRE-EU project.33 It aims to identify individuals who
are ‘healthy obese’ (HO), defined as having a body mass
index >30 in the absence of any of the common metabolic
sequelae of obesity—e.g. hypertension, hypercholesterol-
aemia, impaired glucose tolerance or diabetes—in order to
study the biological and environmental correlates of HO.
Since HO is relatively uncommon, any single study contain-
ing all requisite measures is likely to have inadequate statis-
tical power. DataSHIELD provides an effective way to enact
a secure federated co-analysis of the multiple studies
involved in HOP. This section briefly describes how
Figure 3. Graphical view of pooled data (a), horizontally partitioned (b) and vertically partitioned data (c).
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DataSHIELD was implemented for this application. At the
time of writing, HOP involves 10 studies across eight Euro-
pean countries (Table 2) sharing 96 harmonized variables.
Figure 5 schematizes the DataSHIELD analysis of HOP
data. Under HOP, communications between the AC and
the DCs pass through the BioSHaRE-EU33 MICA37 web
portal. This ensures that links can only be made through a
designated IP name. Such a portal is not a pre-requisite for
a DataSHIELD analysis, but it further enhances security.
In the Hop settings the Analysis Computer is just used to
login to the HOP portal where the client functions are
installed and from where the actual analysis is ran.
Examples of DataSHIELD commands
Although the examples in this section are real as they use
real data from the HOP project, they are included here for il-
lustrative purposes only. For the sake of conciseness—and to
maintain consistency across all examples—we include only
four of the available studies in these examples. Throughout
this section the DataSHIELD commands, in bold and italic
font, are preceded by explanations and followed, where
there is any, by the output of the command, in italic font.
Histogram plots
Figure 6 illustrates the output from a DataSHIELD histo-
gram plot of HDL cholesterol for each of the four studies
(Figure 6A) and for the pooled data (Figure 6B). The
DataSHIELD function ds.histogram filters the informa-
tion returned from each study to remove bars based on a
count of between 1 and 4. This means that potentially
disclosive outliers are not shown on the plot. It however
reports the number of invalid cells in the original grid
density matrix used to produce the graph. For all
DataSHIELD commands, the ‘type’ argument indicates
whether to report results for each study separately
(type5’split’) or across all studies, the default
behaviour.
ds.histogram(’D$LAB_HDL’,type5’split’)
ds.histogram(’D$LAB_HDL’)
ncds: Number of invalid cells (cells with
counts >0 and <5) is 53
finrisk: Number of invalid cells (cells with
counts >0 and <5) is 72
micros: Number of invalid cells (cells with
counts >0 and <5) is 55
kora: Number of invalid cells (cells with
counts >0 and <5) is 75.
Quantiles
The DataSHIELD function ds.quantileMean returns
means and critical quantiles for quantitative variables.
Unlike the conventional summary function in R, the
Figure 4. Overview of a DataSHIELD process. Each of the 8 steps and the terms used to refer to the key components and data exchanged between AC
and DCs are detailed in Table 1.
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DataSHIELD function does not return the minimum and
maximum values because these may be disclosive.
The results below were obtained by running the command
on the quantitative age variable encoding age in years:
One and two-dimensional contingency tables
One-dimensional tables. The output below is generated
by the DataSHIELD function ds.table1D, applied to a
categorical variable holding BMI in three classes—for all
studies combined. In addition to the counts in each cat-
egory, the function also reports column percentages, row
percentages and global percentages. To save space, only
counts are shown here. The function also reports on the
‘validity’ of each study data set (full results being reported
only for studies where the table is entirely non-disclosive,
i.e. no table cells have counts between 1 and 4). As the last
component of the output—$VALIDITY.WARNING—
each source is flagged as having only valid data, or at least
some invalid data.
ds.table1D(’D$PM_BMI_CATEGORIAL’)
$‘TOTAL.VALID.DATA.COUNTS for variable
PM_BMI_CATEGORIAL‘
ncdsfinrisk micros kora TOTAL
1 2453 1777 539 972 5741
2 2905 2096 364 1279 6644
3 1733 1151 157 812 3853
TOTAL 7091 5024 1060 3063 16238
$VALIDITY.WARNING
[1] ‘ALL STUDIES VALID’
Two-dimensional tables. The function ds.table2D gen-
erates two-dimensional contingency tables. Here, the cat-
egorical BMI variable is tabulated against gender. The
function ds.table2D also produces column percentages,
row percentages, global percentages and validity informa-
tion. It also runs chi-square tests for homogeneity on
(nc-1)*(nr-1) degrees of freedom for each study and for all
studies combined, where nc is the number of columns and
nr the number of rows.
ds.table2D(’D$PM_BMI_CATEGORIAL’,
’D$GENDER’)
$‘COMBINED.VALID.DATA.COUNTS–
PM_BMI_CATEGORIAL (rows) V GENDER (cols) ‘
0 1 TOTAL
1 2036 3705 5741
Table 2. Healthy Obese Project collaborating studies and shared number of participants at the time of this work
Study name Host institution Location Participants
Cooperative Health Research in South Tyrol Study
(CHRIS)
European Academy of Bolzano Bolzano, Italy 1583
Cooperative Health Research in the Region of
Augsburg (KORA)
Helmoltz Center Munich Augsburg, Germany 3080
LifeLines Cohort Study (LifeLines) University Medical Center
Groningen
Groningen, The
Netherlands
94516
Mitchelstown Study Population (Mitchelstown) Living Health Clinic in
Mitchelstown
Cork, Ireland 2047
Microisolates in South Tyrol Study (MICROS) European Academy of Bolzano Bolzano, Italy 1060
National Child Development Study (NCDS) University of Leicester Leicester, UK 7210
FINRISK 2007 Study (FINRISK 2007) National Institute for Health and
Welfare
Helsinki, Finland 5024
Nord-Trøndelag Health Study (HUNT) Norwegian University of Science
and Technology
Levanger, Norway 78968
Prevention of REnal and Vascular ENd-stage Disease
study (PREVEND)
University Medical Center
Groningen
Groningen, The
Netherlands
8592
The Study of Health in Pomerania (SHIP) joined HOP
after the analysis reported in this paper, and so the
text and figures refer to 9 not 10 studies
University Medicine of Greifswald Greifswald,
Germany
4308
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2 3826 2818 6644
3 1807 2046 3853
TOTAL 7669 8569 16238
$CHI2.TESTS.FOR.HOMOGENEITY
X2-value df p-value
ncds 350.12295 2 9.370602e-77
finrisk 139.05465 2 6.377738e-31
micros 34.21016 2 3.726980e-08
kora 98.49705 2 4.089196e-22
ALL VALID
STUDIES
COMBINED 604.93484 2 4.365851e-132
Generalized linear models (GLMs)
Because we wanted to directly compare the results of a
GLM analysis under DataSHIELD with the corresponding
results obtained from a conventional R-based GLM
analysis—i.e. with the raw data from all sources physically
combined in one database (Table 3)—our GLM example is
based on four of the HOP studies that explicitly allowed
their data to be physically shared within the HOP consor-
tium, as well as to be analysed via DataSHIELD: NCDS,38
KORA,39 LifeLines40 and Mitchelstown.41
The DataSHIELD GLM function, ds.glm, is currently
constructed to fit linear regression (Gaussian family, identity
link), logistic regression (binomial family, logistic link) and
Poisson regression (Poisson family, log link). It can easily be
extended to encompass other combinations of errors and
links. Because it is based around the conventional glm func-
tion in R, it can fit categorical factors as well as quantitative
covariates, and can make use of the full array of R model-
fitting operators in specifying the formula—e.g. * meaning
all possible interactions between a categorical covariate and
another covariate, or -1 meaning remove the regression con-
stant. Intermediate summaries of the fitting process can be
printed out after each iteration but, for the sake of concise-
ness, they are not reported here; only the final results
Figure 6. Histogram plots of the variable ‘LAB_HDL’ for each study (A) and for the pooled data (B).
Figure 5. For the Healthy Obese Project, communications between AC
and DCs were channelled through a trusted portal.
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(i.e. after the model has converged) are included in the out-
put below. In order to enhance its illustrative value, the par-
ticular model we have fitted contains study-specific terms
allowing for heterogeneity in the baseline risk of disease and
have used the * operator to specify an interaction between
GENDER and a three-level factor encoding BMI. In add-
ition, we compare the estimates and confidence intervals
from the GLM fitted using DataSHIELD with their equiva-
lents from the same GLM fitted directly to a combined data-
base into which the individual-level data from each study
have been physically pooled. This provides empirical con-
firmation of the precise theoretical equivalence of the two
approaches.22 It should be noted that when variables are
initially transferred from Opal into the DataSHIELD R en-
vironment at each source, they are by default placed in a
data frame denoted ‘D’. For the purposes of clarity here,
these variables all have names that are capitalized, and the
prefix ‘D$’ tells R to read them from the data frame. In con-
trast, all new variables created by transformation during the
DataSHIELD session itself have been given lower-case
names—these sit outside ‘D’(at root level in the
DataSHIELD R environment) and are not preceded by ‘D$’.
Application in other settings
In this paper we have illustrated the use of DataSHIELD in
a setting involving research-focused analysis of data that
were originally collected for research purposes. But it could
potentially be of equal value in settings involving co-ana-
lysis of data from multiple health service or other
administrative databases, or the joint analysis of research
data with administrative data. It is for these purposes that
major infrastructural projects7,8 like care.data7,8 and se-
cure data-sharing infrastructures10,11 have been proposed
and developed. For example, the aim of care.data was to
amalgamate medical information on individuals from
Table 3. Comparison of the critical outputs of the same GLM model fitted using DataSHIELD (in light shading) and using
standard R with the physically pooled data (in dark shading)
Parameter Estimate Estimate SE SE P-value P-value
(Intercept) –4.17696 –4.17696 0.11274 0.11274 1.758e-300 <2e-16
Study.id.2 –0.11851 –0.11851 0.11692 0.11692 0.31078 0.31078
Study.id.3 –0.30955 –0.30955 0.08571 0.08571 3.041e-04 3.041e-04
Study.id.4 –0.40626 –0.40626 0.13438 0.13438 2.502e-03 2.502e-03
Age.50 0.06905 0.06905 0.00185 0.00185 1.033e-303 <2e-16
D$gender1 –0.45085 –0.45085 0.10936 0.10936 3.742E-05 3.74E-05
D$pm_bmi_categorial2 0.65056 0.65056 0.09179 0.09179 1.37E-12 1.37E-12
D$pm_bmi_categorial3 1.76134 1.76134 0.09343 0.09343 2.868E-79 <2e-16
D$gender1:d$pm_bmi_categorial2 0.15644 0.15644 0.12917 0.12917 0.22584 0.22584
D$gender1:d$pm_bmi_categorial3 0.24347 0.24347 0.12660 0.12660 0.05446 0.05446
DataSHIELD derived estimates rounded to same decimal places as standard R estimates. To avoid confusion, it should be noted that at a very early stage of the
HOP analysis, the name of the categorical BMI variable was misspelt as ‘…CATEGORIAL…’. As that misspelling is now entrenched in all of the harmonized data
sets etc. we chose not correct it for this paper.
SE, standard error.
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various administrative sources, including general practice
(GP) records, into a single research database held by the
Health and Social Care Information Centre and made
available to approved researchers. Though some of the
concerns that led to the suspension of care.data related to
the possibility of commercial entities such as pharmaceut-
ical and insurance companies being approved as customers,
a central concern was protection of patient confidentiality.
If they are ever to succeed, projects like care.data must
therefore overcome two fundamental data-sharing chal-
lenges. First, they must find a safe and appropriate way to
allow researchers to analyse data drawn from particular
healthcare or other administrative data sources, including
GP medical records, wherein the risk of breaching patient
confidentiality is reduced to an absolute and acceptable
minimum. Depending how many sources need to be ac-
cessed, this could potentially be achieved through a con-
ventional—or single-site—application of horizontal
DataSHIELD (Figure 7a). The second challenge is to se-
curely combine information relating to individuals from a
primary source (e.g. from a particular research project, or
from GP medical records) with other health or administra-
tive records on the same individuals, using record linkage
and co-analysis. This is essential if some of the required
data are not directly available from the primary source
(e.g. hospitalization data, or education data). In such a set-
ting, a vertical implementation of DataSHIELD can play a
useful role (Figure 7b), although it is out of the scope of
this paper to discuss vertical DataSHIELD in detail. In
principle, DataSHIELD could provide a means to reassure
the public that their data were being used in a secure man-
ner. However, important challenges remain: (i) ongoing
technical refinement of the functionality of the vertical im-
plementation of DataSHIELD; (ii) extensive discussion
with data-providing agencies—including government—
and relevant governance committees to ensure that they
are all comfortable with application of DataSHIELD to po-
tentially sensitive administrative data; and (iii) consider-
ation of whether, in any particular setting, the agencies
involved will be willing and able to devote the time and
resources required to prepare and document data ready for
vertical DataSHIELD use. Our future work includes a
focus on addressing these challenges.
Discussion
DataSHIELD enables co-analysis of several collaborating
studies or data sources as if the data from all individuals in
all studies were directly accessible but, in reality, these
data remain completely secure behind the firewalls of their
host computers. This is of significant value in several set-
tings: (i)where ethico-legal or governance restrictions pro-
scribe individual-level data release, or make permission for
such release excessively time-consuming to obtain; (ii) a re-
search group is particularly vulnerable to losing intellectual
property (e.g. in a developing nation) but wishes to freely
share the information held in its data without physically
sharing the data themselves; and (iii)the underlying data
are too large to be physically shared.
All components of the combined platform (Opal/
DataSHIELD) are open source and available without re-
striction or payment. Both the installation and the config-
uration require minimal specialist IT expertise: researchers
with no IT background have already installed Opal with-
out major difficulties by following the wiki documentation
available online.42 DataSHIELD is therefore attractive for
researchers with limited resources. An extensive suite of
functions already exists, but development work continues
and we recently started developing a Graphic User
Interface that requires no prior knowledge of R to run a
DataSHIELD analysis.43 The newest software release of
Opal incorporates an important enhancement. Specifically,
Figure 7. Illustration of DataSHIELD set-up for the analyses of: (a) horizontally partitioned data (similar data, different individuals) held in GP data-
bases and/or data centres. (**Single-site DataSHIELD); and (b) vertically partitioned data requiring record linkage between different types of data on
the same individuals held in a variety of data archives.
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DataSHIELD analysis is now truly parallelized: every com-
mand is sent simultaneously to all DCs—previously, each
command necessarily completed on one DC before being
sent to the next. This substantially speeds up analysis, par-
ticularly with many studies or time-consuming functions.
If processing speed is particularly critical, further time may
be saved by distributing the data from a large study across
several Opal servers. If there are actual problems with the
Opal instance at a given DC, then a message is sent to the
data owner to correct that problem (e.g. the version of
the libraries currently installed is not up to date, or the ser-
ver is down). Crucially, if one or more of the data servers
are unusable, the user can temporarily exclude them from
analysis while they are repaired or updated.
Because in DataSHIELD potentially disclosive com-
mands are not allowed, some analyses that are possible in
standard R are not enabled. In essence, there are two
classes of limitation on potential DataSHIELD functional-
ity: (i) absolute limitations which require an analysis that
can only be undertaken by enabling one of the functional-
ities (e.g. visualizing individual data points) that is
explicitly blocked as a fundamental element of the
DataSHIELD philosophy. For example, this would be the
case for a standard scatter plot. Such limitations can never
be circumvented and so alternatives (e.g. contour and heat-
map plots) are enabled which convey similar information
but without disclosing individual data points; (ii) current
limitations which are functions or models that we be-
lieve are implementable but we have not, as yet, under-
taken or completed the development work required.
As examples, these latter include generalized linear mixed
models44 (including multi-level modelling45,46) and Cox
regression.47
Despite its potential utility, implementation of
DataSHIELD involves significant challenges. First, al-
though set-up is fundamentally straightforward, applica-
tion involves a relatively steep learning curve because the
command structure is complex: it demands specification of
the analysis to be undertaken, the studies to use and how
to combine the results. In mitigation, most complex server-
side functions are now called using simpler client-side
functions and we are working on a menu-driven implemen-
tation. Second, like anyco-analysis involving several stud-
ies, data must be adequately harmonized27,34,35 and the
proposed work must comply with governance stipulations
in every study. Third, good research governance demands
that any published analysis can precisely be replicated. We
are therefore developing systems to automatically identify
the particular DataSHIELD release used for a given ana-
lysis. In addition, each data provider must unambiguously
record the particular freeze of data they contributed. These
fundamental issues apply in many settings other than
DataSHIELD, but because the project could be damaged if
early users were to encounter serious scientific or govern-
ance problems, application has so far been restricted to re-
search groups with whom we are fully collaborating. This
means we can provide active advice and support relating
both to implementation and application. We plan to enable
independent use as early as possible. Fourth, in undertak-
ing a standard DataSHIELD analysis it is assumed that the
data truly are horizontally partitioned, i.e. contributing
sources hold the same variables but on different individuals
(see Figure 3b). So far DataSHIELD has been applied in
settings where individual participants in different studies
are from different countries or from different regions so it
is unlikely that any one person will appear in more
than one source. However, going forward, that cannot al-
ways be assumed. We have therefore been consider-
ing approaches to identify and correct this problem
based on probabilistic record linkage. In the genetic setting
the BioPIN48 provides an alternative solution.
Ongoing work is required. Fifth, despite the care taken
to set up DataSHIELD so that it works properly and
is non-disclosive, it is possible that unanticipated prob-
lems (accidental or malicious) may arise. In order to iden-
tify, describe and rectify any errors or loopholes that
emerge and in order to identify deliberate miscreants, all
commands issued on the client server and enacted on each
data server are permanently logged.
Data sharing platforms, such as care.data, that enable
powerful integrative analysis of research data as well as
data generated by activity in the health service, from dis-
ease or death registries or from other administrative or
governmental sources, have the potential to generate great
societal benefit. Most crucially, they can provide an im-
portant route for production of the raw ‘evidence’ needed
for ‘evidence-based health care’. But, to be pragmatic,
many of the routinely collected healthcare and administra-
tive databases will have to undergo substantial evolution
before their quality and consistency are such that they can
directly be used in high-quality research without exten-
sive preparatory work. By its very nature, such
preparation—which typically includes data cleaning and
data harmonization—cannot usually be undertaken in
DataSHIELD, because it involves investigating discrepan-
cies and/or extreme results in individual data subjects: the
precise functionality that DataSHIELD is designed to
block. Such work must therefore be undertaken ahead of
time by the data generators themselves—and this is de-
manding of time, resources and expertise that—at present -
many administrative data providers may well be unwilling
and/or unable to provide. That said, if the widespread us-
ability of such data is viewed as being of high priority, the
required resources could be forthcoming. Then the primary
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challenge will be to find effective solutions to the profes-
sional and societal challenges presented by the need to en-
sure that all work with individual-level data is rendered
adequately secure. These solutions must respect and
protect individual autonomy and confidentiality while
facilitating the scientific progress from which everybody
benefits. This conundrum is well recognized as demon-
strated in the series of articles under the heading Dealing
with Data in Science in 2011,49 and more recently in a re-
view article exploring the combination of multiple health-
care databases for postmarketing surveillance of drug
and vaccine safety.50 Furthermore, these challenges and
potential solutions provide a crucial focus for professional
organizations aimed specifically at enhancing our capacity
to make effective use of the rapidly accumulating body of
available data in the arenas of health and social care, gov-
ernmental administration and biomedical and social re-
search. These organizations include major pan-European
infrastructural projects in large-scale biomedical sciences
such as: ELIXIR51 and BBMRI (the Biobanking and
Biomolecular Resources Research Infrastructure52,53);
EAGDA (the Expert Advisory Group in Data Access) set
up by four major UK funders (Wellcome Trust, MRC,
ESRC and Cancer Research UK); the Public Population
Project in Genomics and Society54 and most recently, the
Global Alliance for Genomics and Health.55
DataSHIELD provides a radically different way to keep sen-
sitive data from multiple sources completely confidential
while maintaining their full scientific utility; it could prove to
be an invaluable complement to other more conventional
approaches.
No single approach can provide a perfect universal solu-
tion to the challenges arising from the complex interplay
between professional and societal wishes, needs and con-
cerns as healthcare and research data become ever richer,
increasing both their power for good and their potential
risk of disclosure. However, DataSHIELD provides im-
portant opportunities that neatly complement other
approaches. It has already been proven to work in prin-
ciple,12,22 and this paper now addresses the equally taxing
problem: how to make it work in practice. DataSHIELD
now provides a real opportunity to follow the advice of
Kahn in Dealing with Data56 to move the ‘computation to
the data, rather than the data to the computation’.56
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